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To commence the 30 day
Statutory time period for
Appeals as of right (CPLR
5513 [a]), you are advised
to serve a copy of this
Decision & Order, with
notice of Entry, upon all
parties.
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Disp

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE of New York
COUNTY OF ORANGE
--------------------------------------X
In the Matter of the Application of
ARMUNDO CAPO,
DECISION& ORDER
Petitioner,
Index No. 1037-10
-against Motion Date: 04/09/10

NEW YORK STATE DIVISION OF PAROLE,
Respondent,
For a Judgment Pursuant to Article 78
of the Civil Practice Law and Rules.
-------------------------------------X
LUBELL, J.
Petitioner Armundo Capo commenced this CPLR Article 78
proceeding seeking to reverse and vacate an adverse parole release
determination on the grounds that the determination (1) fails to
set forth a detailed written explanation of the factors and reasons
for denying parole; (2) is excessive; (3) is based solely on the
serious nature of the charge; (4) disregarded the rehabilitative
component of the indeterminate sentencing and parole statutes; and

(5) fails to consider all of the mandatory statutory factors:
PAPERS
VERIFIED PETITION/EXHIBITS
A-E
ANSWER AND RETURN/EXHIBITS 1 THROUGH 81

1

NUMBERED
1
2

EXHIBIT 1 (Pre-Sentence Investigations Reports) have been submitted
and reviewed by the Court in camera, as has Part II (Confidential Information)
and Part III (Confidential Written Report to Field").
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REPLY IN OPPOSITION
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Petitioner Armundo Capo is serving three concurrent terms
of incarceration in connection with three separate convictions
arising out of three separate criminal transactions: Criminal
Sale of Controlled Substance in the Third Degree, 4½ to 9 years
(sale of cocain to an undercover agent); Attempted Assault in
the Second Degree, 1½ to 3 years (attempted assault on another
inmate); and Robbery in the Second Degree, five years
incarceration followed by five years of post-release
supervision (gunpoint robbery ). In each case, defendant was
sentenced as a Second Felony Offender.
This CPLR Article 78 proceeding is brought in connection
with petitioner’s first appearance before the New York State
Board of Parole ("Parole Board"), his October 1, 2009
perfection of an administrative appeal of same, and Parole
Board's failure to timely respond within the prescribed time
frame; thus, rendering ripe this application to the Court (see,
9 NYCRR §8006.4[c]).
Upon
rendering
judicial
review
of
administrative
determinations, the Court may not substitute its own judgment
for that of the agency's determination but shall decide if the
determination can be supported on any reasonable basis. "The
New York State Board of Parole's release decisions are
discretionary, and if made in accordance with statutory
requirements, such determinations are not subject to judicial
review" (Samperi v. Rodriquez, 126 A.D.2d 653 [2nd Dept.,1987],
citing, Matter of Davis v. New York State Div. of Parole, 114
A.D.2d 412 [2nd Dept., 1985]). More simply put,
[the Parole Board] has been vested with an
extraordinary degree of responsibility in
determining who will go free and who will
remain in prison, and a petitioner who
seeks to obtain judicial review on the
grounds that the Board did not properly
consider all of the relevant factors, or
that an improper factor was considered,
bears a heavy burden.
(Garcia v. New York State Div. of Parole, 239 A.D.2d 235, 239
2
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[1st Dept., 1998]).

The record before the Court reflects that the Parole Board
considered
the
relevant
statutory
factors,
including
petitioner's
criminal
conduct,
institutional
behavior,
programming accomplishments and his residential and employment
plans upon release (Matter of Silvero v. Dennison, 28 A.D.3d
859 [3rd Dept., 2006]).
Additionally, the reasons for the
denial of parole were outlined in sufficient detail so as to
inform Petitioner of the basis of the decision in accordance
with the provisions of Executive Law § 259-i(2)(a).
The Parole Board "was not required to equally weigh or
discuss each statutory factor or reward petitioner's
achievements while incarcerated" (Matter of Webb v. Travis, 26
A.D.3d 614, 615 [3d Dept., 2006]; see, Matter of Wood v.
Dennison, 25 A.D.3d 1056, 1057 [3d Dept., 2006]). While the
Board did not specifically recite and discuss the weight which
it assessed to each factor, it was not required to do so (King
v. New York State Div. of Parole, 83 N.Y.2d 788, 791 [1994]).
In the end, it is within the Parole Board's discretion to
determine whether a prisoner's positive achievements while in
prison are outweighed by the serious nature of his crime (see,
Romer v. Dennison, 24 A.D.3d 866 [3d Dept., 2005]).
The determination to place a 24-month hold on petition is
within the prescribed guidelines (see, Executive Law
§259-i[2][a] and 9 NYCRR §8002.3[d]) and, under the facts
presented, does not constitute an abuse of discretion and will
not, in any event, be disturbed. This is so even in the face
of petitioner’s Certificate of Earned Eligibility (“CEE”).
Although a CEE “creates a presumption in favor of parole
release of any inmate who, like petitioner, has received a
Certificate of Earned Eligibility and has completed a minimum
term of imprisonment of eight years or less ...” Wallman v.
Travis, 18 AD3d 304, 307 [1st Dept., 2005][citation omitted]),
such is not conclusive on the issue especially where, as here,
the record adequately demonstrates and there is a rational
basis for concluding that a “reasonable probability” exists
that, if released, the inmate will not be law abiding and that
such release is not compatible with the welfare of society.
There being no merit to these or any other contentions
3
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raised by Petitioner, and the Court being satisfied that the
Board gave adequate and due consideration to the statutory
factors and that Petitioner failed to demonstrate any
impropriety with the challenged determination such that it can
be said to be affected by irrationality bordering on
impropriety or is otherwise subject to annulment (see, Romer
v. Travis, 299 A.D.2d 553 [2nd Dept., 2002]; Matter of Larrier
v New York State Board of Parole Appeals Unit, 283 A.D.2d 700
[3rd Dept., 2001]; Matter of Guerin v New York State Division
of Parole, 276 A.D.2d 899 [3rd Dept., 2000]), it hereby
ORDERED, the petition be and is hereby denied.
ORDERED, that the petition be and is hereby dismissed in
all respects.
The foregoing constitutes the Opinion, Decision, and Order
of the Court.
Dated: Goshen, New York
June 18, 2010

S/_____________________________
HON. LEWIS J. LUBELL, J.S.C.
TO:

Armundo Capo
DIN 03-R-4937
Mid-Orange Correctional Facility
900 Kings Highway
Warwick, NY 10990
Jeane L. Strickland Smith
Assistant Attorney General
Office of the NYS Attorney General
235 Main Street
Poughkeepsie, NY 12601
David Darwin, Esq.
Orange County Attorney
255 Main Street
Goshen, New York 10924
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